Abstract
This paper tests the effect of governance factor related to the
shareholder ownership and to the auditor’s characteristic on the abnormal
accounting accruals in Tunisian banks. The aim of this study is to estimate the
abnormal accruals drawing on the classical Kothari et al (2005) [13] model to
demonstrate their progress before and after Tunisian revolution. Indeed,
through the difference-in-difference approach, “DID,” this paper attempts to
deduct the disciplinary factors that contribute to follow up these accruals
using a linear regression model. The results show that the accounting
manipulation and net income smoothing in Tunisian banks worsened after the
Tunisian revolution, contrary to what was expected. This aggravation is shown
by the "DID" approach that was the result of the market discipline
deterioration played by the majority of shareholders, the external auditors and
the supervisory board. The overrun shareholders ownership in Tunisian banks
have caused an interest collision between them and the managers. The latter in
turn, made collisions with the external auditors through rewards for a long
period.