Abstract
This paper examines the association
between related party transactions (RPTs) and partner-level audit opinion
shopping. The use of RPTs, generally diverse and complex, associates with an
increased audit risk and the probability of receiving modified audit opinions
(MAOs). In China, the audit market is dispersed and audit firms’ internal
control mechanisms are weak. This enables firms to shop for a more lenient
audit partner within the same audit firm to obtain a favorable opinion. I argue
that firms with more RPTs have greater incentives to press audit firms to
switch engagement partners to obtain more favorable opinions. Based on a large
sample of Chinese listed firms, I find that successful partner-level opinion
shopping increases as the amounts of RPTs rises. I also find that the positive
relationship between RPTs and successful opinion shopping is more pronounced in
non-operating RPTs. Policymakers may consider RPTs to have a significant effect
on auditor independence and design monitoring mechanisms to prevent
partner-level opinion shopping.
JEL classification numbers: G34, M42
Keywords: Opinion shopping,
Partner switch, Audit quality, Related party transactions