Abstract
This paper investigates the interaction
between non-standard debt investment (NSDI) and non-principal-guaranteed wealth
management products (WMPs) of commercial banks in China after controlling the
influences of several bank-specific and regulatory determinants. A credit
switching model is employed to illustrate the mechanism in which special
interest vehicles (SIVs) serve as the conduits for parent banks to conduct
regulatory arbitrage by trade-off between on-balance-sheet funding strategy
NSDI and off-balance-sheet financing via consignment of WMPs. Using a panel
data set of 10 state-owned and joint-stock listed commercial banks over a
period of six years (from 2013H2 to 2019H1), our results indicate there exists
some statistically significant mutual promotion effects between NSDI and WMPs
for Chinese banking and shadow banking system. We also find significant
liquidity shock from WMPs to the interbank market. On average, the liquidity
need is 4.6% of the WMPs’ total balance. This study provides a new perspective
to interpret the mechanism of the causes and consequences of shadow banking in China.
JEL classification numbers: C33 G21 G28
Keywords: Non-standard Debt, Wealth Management Product, Liquidity
Shock, Shadow Banking.