Abstract
The present work aims to analyze the
economic efficiency of judicial conciliation in defaulted credit contracts,
through a case study of a major Brazilian financial institution, between the
years 2014 and 2019. From the perspective of the economic analysis of law, this
study analyzes the efficiency of conciliation in collective settlement events
organized by the Federal Court, using three methods of assessment: maximization
of gains and minimization of costs, Pareto efficiency, and the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion. The results indicate that conciliation, when successful,
demonstrates economic efficiency; however, as a public policy, it does not
achieve indices compatible with the advantages stemming from its adoption.
These findings contribute to the scientific literature that studies alternative
dispute-resolution methods by providing empirical evidence for financial
institutions and policymakers in the sector.
JEL classification numbers: K10, K12, K15, K41.
Keywords: Economic Analysis of Law, Pareto’s efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks
criterion, Judicial Conciliation, Economic Efficiency.