Allingham and Sandmo (J. Public Econ., 1972) analyze by the example
of tax evasion and non-compliance the intended underreporting of taxpayers via
concave and twice differentiable utility functions within Becker's economics-of-crime
theory (J. Political Econ., 1968) on behavioral aspects of illicit activities.
This work is concerned with how to build feasible utility functions applicable
for experiments, theoretical investigations and / or numerical simulations of
any kind of such illicit activities. It turns out that feasible utility
functions form a set of Allingham-Sandmo-Functions applicable for Risk Averse
and Neutral Taxpayers (ASFRANT) which
is a non-commutative semiring with left-annihilating zero and unity.
JEL classification numbers: C02, H26.
Keywords: Agent-based Modeling, Expected Utility, Semiring, Tax