Abstract
Market-driven
policies to address the externality of climate change include carbon taxes and emissions
trading systems. The relationship between these carbon pricing instruments'
designs and variations in the business cycle is the main topic of this essay.
One pressing policy issue is specifically whether and how these tools ought to
react to business cycles. In order to respond, the paper compiles pertinent
theoretical and empirical findings from scholarly works. It concludes that by
including responsiveness into the architecture of carbon pricing instruments,
the regulatory burden can be lessened over time and distributed more fairly.
This can be accomplished specifically by easing the cap during economic
expansions and tightening it during recessions in contrast to a fixed cap
emissions trading scheme. In a similar vein, a carbon tax regime that is less
responsive to cycles and levies a higher tax during expansions and a lower tax
during recessions is probably going to enhance welfare. It is difficult to
implement a process that makes carbon pricing devices in the real world
responsive. The paper focuses on the major groups of mechanisms that have been
studied in the literature, giving a general overview of the trade-offs
involved. When selecting a responsiveness-inducing mechanism, it is important
to take into account the unique features of the nation, including its
institutional background, any pertinent political economy issues, and the
peculiarities of variations in its GDP and emissions.
JEL classification numbers: G12, G17, G18.
Keywords: Carbon emission
trading market, GARCH model, VaR.