Abstract
This paper examines whether the investment efficiency of managers
and accounting conservatism affect the idiosyncratic risks to investors. The
empirical findings suggest the following. Firstly, overinvestment
(underinvestment) by managers increases (decreases) idiosyncratic risks to
investors. Secondly, accounting conservatism enhances information quality and
lowers the idiosyncratic risks. Finally, accounting conservatism mitigates the
investment inefficiency by manager and affects the idiosyncratic risks to
investors, meaning it mitigates manager’s overinvestment and lowers the
idiosyncratic risks to investors. In the case of underinvestment, accounting
conservatism improves manager’s motivation for investment, and thus, the
idiosyncratic risks to investors.
JEL classification numbers: G32, M41, D81
Keywords: Idiosyncratic risk, Investment efficiency, Over-investment,
Under-investment, Accounting conservatism.