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Abstract
With the continuous increase in global attention to climate change
issues, corporate carbon information disclosure has become a key area of focus
for both the academic and practical communities. This study uses the theories
of information asymmetry, reputation, and the KMRW reputation model to explore
the decision-making logic of Chinese enterprises' carbon information disclosure
behavior. The research shows: (1) in a single-stage game, enterprises exhibit
different behavioral preferences based on rational considerations. (2) In a
multi-stage repeated game, they will carefully balance short-term interests and
long-term reputation impacts. (3) Meanwhile, factors such as carbon prices,
excess returns, and regulatory penalties will all influence the strategy choices
of non-moral enterprises. The model's conclusions strongly reveal that
enterprises should deeply recognize the significance of reputation for
long-term sustainable development and rationally choose to truthfully disclose
carbon information to achieve utility maximization. Promoting enterprises to
actively fulfill their carbon information disclosure responsibilities,
improving the quality of carbon information disclosure, and thereby promoting
sustainable economic and social development will provide strong support for
achieving the goals of "carbon peak and carbon neutrality".
JEL classification numbers: O30, O31, O32, O33.
Keywords: Carbon information disclosure, Incomplete information,
Dynamic game, KMRW reputation model.